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ABSTRACT  
   
Over the last twenty years, governments at all levels have made changes to increase 
their level of accountability and transparency.  The researcher proposed that the concepts 
of organizational agility (OA) (leveraging core competencies, proactively seeking new 
opportunities, implementation of performance metrics, and strategically planning projects) 
are well-aligned with the public accountability systems.  In the first part of this dissertation, 
the researcher examined the components of a “Value-Based Model” for public works 
contractor selection and project delivery, and its propensity to increase public 
accountability. The researcher studied 415 projects ($561.47M value) delivered with the 
Value-Based Model at eight different public agencies over a ten-year period. 
Next, the researcher analyzed factors affecting contractor organizational agility.  In 
light of the “Great Recession”, the concepts of organizational agility offers insights into 
companies could have made different strategic decisions to avoid many of the issues faced.  
Construction was particularly affected: by January 2010, unemployment reached 
approximately 20 percent.  One way to combat declining profits is to adjust general 
overhead costs (indirect expenses).  These costs include items such as home office 
expenses, business development, and bonuses.  The objective of the second part of this 
research was to conduct a study of how contractors responded to dynamic market 
conditions and to identify if whether contractors’ company attributes impacted their 
responses to the market changes.  A total of 437 contractors responded to the survey, and 
92 percent reported that they reduced overhead costs in five areas, by an average of about 
15 percent.  Additional analysis suggests that there are distinct categories of overhead 
flexibility. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
The National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR), previously known 
as the National Performance Review, was a directive from President Bill Clinton in 1993 
to conduct an extensive review of all facets of the federal government in an effort to reduce 
spending and increase efficiency (Gore, 1993; Kamensky, 2001).  The report 
acknowledged that the government was historically bureaucratic, bogged down in red tape 
and rules, burdened by excessive service acquisitions costs, faced resistance in making 
changes to the status quo, and was susceptible to corruption.  One of the important results 
from the study was Congress’ creation of the Government Performance Results Act 
(GPRA) of 1993.  The Act was designed to improve accountability to the public through 
increased transparency and availability of objective performance information for 
policymakers.  President George W. Bush expanded the role of GPRA through the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to help streamline the reporting requirements of various 
agencies (Schoen, 2007).  These tools have had an impact: for instance, in 2006 President 
Bush recommended eliminating 48 programs (of the 607 evaluated) based on their PART 
assessment scores and other factors (Gruber, 2005). 
GPRA, and subsequent programs, are attempts to increase the accountability of 
government entities through the use of performance information and specifically to 
increase public accountability and solve many of the problems bedeviling large, public 
construction efforts and creating the over-budget-and-behind-schedule outcomes 
commonly associated with them.  From a business perspective, performance improvements 
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come from methods that increase the organizational agility of public agencies: that is, the 
legislation attempts to encourage rapid response to changing societal conditions in the most 
cost-effective manner that yields highly beneficial results.  The concept of “agility” has 
applicability in the public sector as much as it does in the private.  Yet, the two sectors, of 
course, are hugely different.  Public officials often face competing accountability systems 
in numerous facets of delivering public goods and services. 
One area that is particularly susceptible to conflicting accountability requirements 
is the provision of public works projects and its intersection with the budgeting process.  
Justice and Miller’s 2011 study of New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA) found that the “…dilemma of accountability here resulted not from conflicts 
between public accountability systems or the mixed market and nonmarket nature of the 
MTA but instead from a conflict between values within the professional accountability 
system” (p. 323). 
This paper first frames the concepts of organizational agility within the context of 
public entities, and considers the various ways in which agile concepts increase public 
agencies’ propensity for accountability and transparency.  Agility stems from the 
manufacturing industry in response to increasing demands for rapid response to changing 
customer preferences (Gunasekaran, 1999; Nagel & Dove, 1991; Yusuf, Sarhadi, & 
Gunasekaran, 1999).  At first glance the ideas may seem inconsistent with public values, 
but further analysis shows that they are, in fact, quite in line.  The public certainly wants 
their representative government to respond quickly to changing needs, more accountability, 
be cost-effective in using taxpayer funds, and be flexible enough to address the concerns 
of the general population. 
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The paper then discusses a “value-based model” (VBM) in the context of the five 
major public accountability systems (bureaucratic, legal, professional, political, and 
market).  The paper concludes with a ten-year longitudinal case study of eight public users’ 
implementation of the agility and public accountability on 415 public works projects 
($561.47M in project value). 
 
AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
The past several years have been marked by significant economic changes in the 
United States and throughout the world.  The “Great Recession” had wide-ranging impact 
on numerous industries, but particularly those tied to the business of housing, both on the 
financial and construction sides.  The Recession lasted approximately 18 months, from 
December 2007 to June 2009 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).  Many 
organizations were substantially affected by the downturn and were forced to change how 
they transacted with other businesses.  Banks’ lending requirements became more 
stringent, bonding companies were more selective of their clientele, government entities 
increased their oversight and accountability measures, and consumers limited expenditure 
of their disposable income. 
Economies are highly interdependent systems: the success (or failure) of one group 
of entities certainly has an impact on others within the system.  This paper first provides 
contextual data of the U.S. economy, and its specific impact on the construction industry.  
The researcher focused on construction spending and employment rates, and then provided 
a financial snapshot of the typical company during and after the recession.  The data shows 
that many construction companies experienced severe losses.  The researcher conducted a 
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survey of contractors on how they adjusted their internal overhead expenses as a direct 
result of the recession.  The paper concludes with an analysis of these expenses and offers 
insights into how certain company traits might affect their ability to adjust overhead. 
 
OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
Some background is needed to understand how markets change, and the impact that 
competition has on internal structures of business.  Many decades ago, the Austrian 
economist Schumpeter stated, “There is certainly no point in trying to conserve obsolescent 
industries indefinitely; but there is point in trying to avoid their coming down with a crash 
and in attempting to turn a rout, which may become a center of cumulative depressive 
effects, into orderly retreat.” (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 90).  A reflection on the 2008-2013 
recession may bring about similar questions, as the industry, and especially construction, 
attempt to rethink their corporate structures, in terms of labor forces, business processes, 
and financial structures.  Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” describes a 
phenomenon whereby firms successfully enter a market, which therefore encourages other 
companies to also enter it (D’Aveni & Gunther, 1994; Schumpeter, 1943; Wiggins & 
Ruefli, 2005).  With a well-established market, like construction, the cost pressure is very 
strong.  This pressure should force contractors to adopt advanced approaches to financial 
management.  In essence, this is really a discussion on competitive edge – companies build 
up their competitive advantage over time through a series of small advances whose 
cumulative effect distinguishes high performers (Porter, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
Public agencies have long sought to increase their adaptability to best meet the 
needs of the public, while still maintaining a level of accountability to multiple parties.  
Accountability to the greater public has often been at the forefront of discussion of the 
average citizen, program administrators, political leaders, and so many others.  After an 
extensive review of the literature and in reflection of the researcher’s professional 
experience, four tenets of organizational agility (OA) offer insights into improving the 
provision of public services.  These tenets include: identifying and leverage core 
competencies, proactively seeking new opportunities, implementation of performance 
metrics, and instituting strategic pre-planning.  OA is then framed within the context of 
public accountability. 
 
Concepts of Organizational Agility 
Leverage core competencies 
Core competencies are those skills sets that uniquely qualify an organization for 
long-term success (Porter, 1985).  In general, core competencies do three things: provide 
access to many different potential buyers, clearly add benefit to the customer, and are 
difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  By extension, an agile 
organization is one that proactively identifies and builds their key skills.  Agile 
organizations have an unrelenting focus on building their skills ahead of the market 
(Nohria, Joyce, & Roberson, 2003; Sull, 2009).  Public agencies certainly do not compete 
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in the same sense as private businesses do, but this does not preclude them from leveraging 
their own assets to create better, value-generating services for the taxpayer.  For instance, 
a city may have unique local geographic features or business opportunities that 
substantially differentiates it from other cities.  If the city had a high degree of operational 
agility, it would align staff and other resources to drastically bolster the public’s access to, 
and use of, these core competencies. 
 
Seek New Opportunities 
Organizational flexibility is the capacity of institutions to successfully respond to a 
wide range of possibilities, changing environmental factors, unforeseen circumstances, and 
new competition (Gerwin, 2005; Li & Zhao, 2006; Pernici & Weske, 2006).  People in a 
flexible organization are generally more comfortable with change (compared to an 
inflexible entity), and face less resistance in making changes.  Agile organizations, while 
similar to flexible organizations, respond to change at a more rapid pace (Dyer & Shafer, 
1998; Goldman, Nagel, & Preiss, 1995; McGaughey, 1999).  The key differentiating factor 
of an agile organization is the speed by which it responds to the new conditions of its 
environment.  Agile organizations find, and act on, new opportunities faster than their 
competitors.  An agile city government, for instance, may seek to adjust to fund balances 
in anticipation of changing financial demographics of its tax base, bolster its maintenance 
budget in advance of failing infrastructure, or make performance metrics of a particular 
government service publically available. 
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Performance Metrics 
A third concept of agility is an organization’s use of performance metrics for the 
key areas of their business.  Performance information helps an entity identify whether they 
are meeting objectives or are responsive to their constituents needs (Greene, 2005; Holzer 
& Schwester, 2011).  These measurements should be directly tied the agency’s stated 
objectives, goals, and core competencies (Rivlin, 1971).  These measurements will be what 
drives the organization to improve how it operates, and to what degree.  It is critical then 
that the measurements sufficiently describe the organization’s overall performance, while 
also being relatively simple to calculate.  If the amount of resources required to generate 
the measurements exceeds the potential benefits from having the metric, then the 
measurement is too complex.  Metrics that are developed haphazardly will result in 
misrepresentation of the agency’s performance and increase internal resistance to adopting 
the measures (Holzer & Schwester, 2011). 
 
Pre-planning 
Finally, we also consider the concept of pre-planning as another tool within 
organizational agility.  Pre-planning or strategizing involves looking at the feasibility of an 
effort, expected costs and time needs, environmental factors, and other risk considerations 
(Gibson Jr., Kaczmarowski, & Lore Jr., 1995).  Or, stated another way, agile organizations 
use systems thinking and, “have an appreciation of the complex interplay among good 
management practices… even the best people cannot overcome the constraints imposed by 
the bad systems” (Worley, Williams, & Lawler III, 2014, p. 114).  Agile public 
organizations, then, are those who think ahead, strategically consider the risks they may 
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face in a new project or policy change, and involve key stakeholders in the process (Arteta 
& Giachetti, 2004). 
 
Increasing Organizational Agility 
The question naturally becomes, “What can organizations do to increase their 
agility and reap its benefits?”  High levels of OA are characterized by speed in adapting to 
new situations with a certain degree of relative ease, and are critical to maintaining 
sustained success (Macias-Lizaso & Thiel, 2006; Powell Jr, 2002).  Nevertheless, in order 
for groups to even adjust to a new change, they must have the right kind of information at 
the right time (Walsh, Bryson, & Lonti, 2002).  Generally, “agile” performance 
benchmarks fall under cost, time, and expectation / satisfaction categories (Dyer & Shafer, 
1998; Gong & Janssen, 2012). 
Organizations may also use benchmarking or performance measurement as a way 
of quantifying various facets of performance, such that they can compare their performance 
to competitors, or internally over a set period of time.  Benchmarking is a quantitative 
method of measuring outcomes over a period of time to understand how these measures 
are changing (internal benchmarking), or to provide a comparison against standard industry 
results (external benchmarking) (Camp, 1989; Fibuch & Van Way, 2013).  In fact, many 
public organizations are beginning to collaborate and establish a unified approach to 
measuring performance, both in terms of using a standard set of measures and also sharing 
this information with each other (Knutsson, Ramberg, & Tagesson, 2012; Siverbo & 
Johansson, 2006). 
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However, while these might seem appealing, organizations (and especially public 
agencies) must not underestimate the tremendous amount effort it will take to start 
implementing some of the agile concepts and measures (Ankrah & Langford, 2005; K. T. 
Sullivan, 2011).  Many of long-standing systems at the foundation for the delivery of public 
goods and services are structurally incapable of providing information in a format that is 
conducive to “agile” behavior (Gong & Janssen, 2012).  Organizational agility and 
flexibility can also change on a project-by-project basis.  One study found that as a public 
works’ project scope (cost and schedule duration) increased, so did personnel resistance to 
implementing project-level innovations and changes (Lines, Sullivan, Smithwick, & 
Mischung, 2015).  However, this same study also found that organizations that took a long-
term approach (in making the process-improvement adjustments) had less resistance to the 
change. 
 
Public Accountability Frameworks 
If profitability is the measure of success for the private industry, then public 
accountability is the currency by which public entities operate and deliver value to their 
constituents.  While the concepts of organizational agility came out of manufacturing and 
business process analysis, many of the tenets of OA can help government organizations to 
increase their level of accountability.  Just as investors anticipate a return on their shares, 
citizens expect that their tax dollars will be used efficiently and for programs that the 
taxpayer feels are in their own best interests.  That is, citizens expect the government to be 
accountable for the monies they are given. 
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First, a brief discussion is needed on what drives government action with respect to 
citizens’ expectations.  The literature identifies five different types of public accountability 
frameworks (Finer, 1941; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).  However, the systems can 
sometimes conflict with administrators’ diverse directions and requirements (Justice & 
Miller, 2011).  The five identified public accountability frameworks are: 
1. The defining trait of bureaucratic accountability systems is a clear command-and-
control structure.  Priorities are set by leadership, and subordinates are expected to 
carry out the necessary support tasks.  The superiors manage their subordinates 
through tight control and explicit direction on what should, or should not, take 
place. 
2. Unlike bureaucratic accountability, legal accountability is maintained by an 
external entity who oversees and directs the agency.  These external entities include 
various lawmaking bodies (e.g., congress).  The external nature of the legal entity 
changes the organizational structure of the public agency so that employees are 
motivated by the nature of the “third-party review” of their work. 
3. Professional accountability is a relatively new concept.  As today’s social, 
economic, and political challenges become increasingly complex, professional 
accountability encourages agencies to use the expertise of their own staff and 
external agencies.  In other words, give the right person the right job at the right 
time.  This system is quite different from a bureaucratic accountability structure, in 
that professional accountability derives authority from individuals’ relative skills 
(versus the position-based authority characteristic of a bureaucracy). 
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4. While legal accountability is based on legislated rules, political accountability 
recognizes the impact that the appointment of various officials has on the agency’s 
constituents.  It is designed so that the agency, as a whole, can answer the question, 
“Whom do I actually serve?”  Political appointments can help to communicate the 
relative importance of the leadership’s goals. 
5. This fifth framework, identified by Justice and Miller (2011), allows the public to 
have some choice as to how the government actually provides service.  Market 
accountability creates a system of private consumer choice for the provision of 
publically-provided goods. 
 
The literature identifies several methods for increasing public accountability (Day 
& Klein, 1987; Dicke & Ott, 1999; Rist, 1989).  First, auditing government functions 
ensures that the execution of the programs or projects adheres to the planned 
implementation.  The auditing approach assumes that process being accessed will actually 
yield the intended results – auditing does not look at the final impact.  Monitoring 
assessments verifies that the service being performed falls within the performance 
requirements.  It is seen as an active process of observing how the service is being carried 
out, quantification of activities, and other inspections.  A contract is a document that 
attempts to spell out what should be done, and by whom.  While contracts attempt to 
provide detailed instruction on task requirements, the parties must strike a balance.  Some 
argue that informal agreements, depending on the scope of the agreement, can be more 
efficient because more formal contracts are prohibitive due to resource costs with preparing 
such a detailed document (Kessler & Leider, 2011).  Contracts are generally most effective 
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where the two entities have a large bargaining position differential (Evan, 1963).  That is, 
when the two entities have vastly different sizes or internal operations, a contract generally 
creates a better understanding of the requirements. 
In many ways, a high level of organizational agility is prerequisite to achieving 
appropriate levels of accountability.  As shown in Table 1, public agencies that successfully 
implement the agile concepts can work to shape their internal organizational culture, and 
as a result, increase public accountability. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of Organizational Agility and Its Impact on Public Accountability 
Agile Concept How it Increases Public Accountability 
Leverage core competencies. Some municipalities may offer unique geographic or business 
assets that, if leveraged, would help increase its tax base or 
citizen satisfaction. 
 
Collect the right information, at the 
right time, from the right sources.  Use 
performance metrics. 
Performance metrics help identify how efficient government 
funds are being used, and how well the agency is performing 
according its strategic plan, or perhaps how well they are 
leveraging their core competencies. 
 
Proactively seek out new 
opportunities, or quickly adapt to 
changing environmental, economic, or 
societal conditions. 
 
Citizens want their government to respond to their needs.  A 
constant “looking ahead” mentality by public administrators 
will increase the agency’s ability to foresee changes. 
Strategically plan out efforts and 
targets 
Planning helps communicate the public agency’s long term 
objectives, and provide justification for the types of funding 
received or taxes collected 
 
Public Accountability in the Built Environment 
One area that has had relatively poor performance is public works and the various 
functions therein (architecture, design, construction, facility management).  The 
construction industry has experienced many years of low performance.  Several studies 
13 
have reported that construction projects were completed between 25 and 35 percent over 
budget, and upwards of 50 percent were completed late (Georgy, Chang, & Zhang, 2005; 
Post, 1998).  A recent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that only 2.5 percent of 
projects were successful, when considering scope, cost, schedule, and business benefits 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).  Large projects have been reported to have cost and 
schedule deviation by as much as 200 percent (Condon & Hartman, 2004).  Furthermore, 
the cost of capital construction projects has increased by approximately 140 percent, 
excluding inflation (Westney Consulting Group, 2014).  Almost half (47 percent) of this 
cost increase is attributed to increased managerial efforts by both owners and contractors.  
In short, these data show that public works projects are generally not successful while at 
the same time increasing the cost to the taxpayer. 
An analysis of the contractual relationship between the public owner and 
contractors helps explain the persistent levels of low performance in the built environment.  
Public works projects are typically awarded to the low bidder (Sturts & Griffis, 2005).  
When contracts are awarded solely on the basis of price, the owner is assuming that other 
factors (i.e., past performance, risk management capability, technical capability) do not 
provide enough differential to warrant consideration.  Price-based award treats the service 
providers (be it contractors, business process consultants, healthcare providers, etc.) as if 
they were commodities.  As a result, vendors become less efficient and quality goes down 
(Cotts, 2003; Singh & Tiong, 2005).  The owner’s actions of making price-based awards 
decreases the industry’s incentives to spend resources on training and skill development 
(Marquardt, 2001).  In the long run, low bid procurement in high risk areas (such as 
construction) is unsustainable (Dorée, 2004). 
14 
Therefore, the hallmarks of accountable, agile organizations (i.e., use of 
performance metrics for positive accountability, pre-planning, profitable / efficient 
adventures) appear to be absent from many public works projects. 
 
Value-Based Approach to Agility and Public Accountability 
Price-based practices (and the reliance on a contract to ensure performance) are 
incongruent with organizational agility and public accountability concepts previously 
discussed.  In the past ten years, some owners have started using a “value-based model” 
(VBM) for the provision of their design and construction services (K. T. Sullivan, 2011).  
VBM does not focus on the contractual mechanism between the owner and contractor, but 
rather focuses on improving interactions between the two entities, instituting pre-planning, 
and establishing performance metrics of the project (Lines, Sullivan, Hurtado, & Savicky, 
2014; K. Sullivan, Kashiwagi, & Chong, 2009).  The VBM has three-phases that, when 
used in conjunction, are designed to increase public agencies’ accountability through pre-
contract planning and performance measurement (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Three Phases of the Value-Based Model 
 
Phase 1:
Selection
•Develope scope and 
requirements [prior to Phase 1]
•Solicit proposals from the 
industry
•Owner evalution of proposals
Phase 2:
Pre-planning
•Team training
•Kick-off meeting
•Plan project deliverables
•Prepare contract
•Summary meeting
• Identify performance 
measurements
Phase 3:
Project Execution
•Contractor reports regularly on 
project performance
•Public agency monitors project 
performance
•Summarize multiple projects 
into "performance dashboard"
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Phase One: Selection 
Typically, the owner will develop a description of their requirements for the project, 
an estimated cost, and a timeline.  This information may be developed by external 
consultants, architects / engineers, or internal subject matter experts.  In traditional 
construction projects, this will include a full set of detailed plans and specifications.  While 
the VBM is instituted by the owner, it relies on the expertise of the contracted vendors and 
their personnel.  Within the constraints of their internal resources, the owner should provide 
as much detail as possible about their existing conditions and major goals of the project.  
Once scope development is complete, the owner will solicit proposals from the industry, 
typically in a Request for Proposals (RFP).  For further details about the Selection process, 
see (K. T. Sullivan, 2011) and (Kashiwagi, 2012). 
 
Phase 2: Pre-planning 
The Pre-planning phase is a major differentiator from the traditional project 
delivery mechanisms (Lines et al., 2014; Smithwick, Schultz, Sullivan, & Kashiwagi, 
2013).  Phase 2 is carried out with the single potential best contractor identified from Phase 
1, and typically lasts between two and four weeks, depending on the project’s complexity 
and propensity for risk.  The primary objective of the pre-planning phase is align the key 
parties’ (owner, contractor, public constituents) expectations (Schein, 2010), through the 
development of a project execution plan, project performance metrics, a risk management 
plan, financial summary, project schedule, and any other required documentation. 
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Phase 3: Project Execution 
After successful completion of the Pre-planning phase, a contract is awarded and 
the project or service commences.  In the VBM, the contractor will report on project status 
with respect to the baseline cost and schedule measurements identified in Phase 2.  This 
regular reporting of the performance metrics is what creates accountability.  It allows the 
public agency to improve their agility by identifying risk in the delivery of public services, 
where changes might need to be made, and minimizes the inefficient use of public funds 
(due to a lack of performance information on the project).  Once the project is complete, a 
closeout survey will be completed by the owner’s project manager to measure satisfaction. 
 
AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) used several indicators to 
confirm the existence of the recession, including manufacturing sales, personal income, 
and payroll.  These measures, along with several others, clearly show that the U.S. was 
experiencing tremendous financial turmoil.  In an effort to highlight the reduction of 
construction spending, the researcher analyzed construction spending and employment 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Construction Spending 
Figure 2 presents the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation-adjusted 
nonresidential construction put in place (CIP) from the period January 2007 to December 
2014 (one year before the recession and five years after).  The researcher used seasonally-
adjusted data and also adjusted for inflation using the producer price index (inputs to new 
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construction, series WPUIP2310001 from the BLS).  Nonresidential data was not available 
prior to 2010 (however, the researcher observed that both residential and nonresidential 
spending showed similar patterns of change). 
 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. GDP and Construction Put in Place 
 
During the Great Recession, construction put in place remained largely unaffected, 
with a mean value of approximately $364B.  The recession ended, per NBER’s definition, 
once GDP started increasing.  Almost at the same time, construction put in place began 
losing substantial value, reaching a low of about $246B in April 2011, a 32 percent 
reduction.  Construction spending remained close to this level, slowly increasing.  Figure 
2 highlights the lagging and extended impact of decreased construction spending (with 
respect to GDP). 
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Unemployment 
As a result of the significant decrease in construction spending, unemployment rate 
during this same time frame increased to about 20 percent, from 8 percent, right before the 
recession.  Figure 3 presents the National and Construction mean annual unemployment 
rates.  The researcher averaged monthly raw employment levels (seasonally adjusted data 
was not available) as provided by the BLS.  The unemployment rate is the number of 
unemployed individuals as a percentage of the labor force. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Annual National and Construction Unemployment Rates 
 
While the United States has experienced several periods of relatively high 
unemployment in the past, the changes to the labor markets during the Great Recession 
were the most dramatic since the 1940s (Elsby, Hobijn, & Sahin, 2010).  In fact, the peak 
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national unemployment level in October 2009 was the largest increase (about 5.7 
percentage points) since World War II (Elsby et al., 2010).  Compare this to the most recent 
recessions (1990 and 2001), which each had unemployment increases of about 2.5 
percentages points.  Furthermore, Elsby et al. (2010) identify that young males were 
substantially affected by the Great Recession, more so than other demographics (as in other 
downturns).  The reason is that people in this demographic (younger males) tend to work 
in industries that are highly cyclical in nature – such as construction (Şahin, Song, & 
Hobijn, 2010).  As contractors laid off workers, these individuals attempted to find work 
elsewhere in the industry, but generally to no avail.  Şahin et al. (2010) identify that these 
people eventually find work in another industry, but at a significant loss in household 
income – which further perpetuates the recession.  This also further reduces the available 
labor pool in construction once the market begins to recover. 
 
Challenging Economic Conditions: Overhead Reduction 
The cycles of high and low construction activity is a regular occurred in the U.S. 
economy, and has been evident since data collection started in the early 1900’s.  As less 
work becomes available, one option contractors have is to reduce their internal overhead 
requirements (Schleifer, 2009; Schleifer, Sullivan, & Murdough, 2014).  Overhead 
expenses are those items which cannot be allocated to the production of one particular item, 
and are not embedded in the actual finished construction product (Cilensek, 1991; Fultz, 
1980).  For instance, overhead may include costs such as bonuses, travel, business 
development, charity, and so on. 
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One of the main challenges with overhead is that once it is “put on”, many 
companies see the expense as a permanent part of their normal operating costs (Dale & 
Bevington, 1989).  As a result, overhead rarely decreases which therefore eliminates any 
potential retained earnings (Snodgrass, 1991).  Said in another way, unchecked overhead 
expenses represent the opportunity cost of funds that could have otherwise been invested 
in the business’s core functions.  However, not all overhead is the same.  Some companies 
are highly bureaucratic and slow to change, while others have some level of flexibility built 
into their overhead structure.  One study looking at manufacturing overhead found that 
companies can move to more ‘robust’ structures that allow rapid response to changing 
market conditions (Blaxill & Hout, 1991).  These changes, however, are not a quick fix: it 
requires a fundamental shift in behavior and organizational culture. 
There are several ways that construction companies can appropriately manage their 
internal overhead.  One approach is to bring on up to 25 percent of overhead staff and office 
space as temporary (Schleifer, 2014b).  Under this method, companies would be able to 
quickly reduce their overhead when less work becomes available and therefore allowing 
the company to maintain profitability.  Another tactic is maintaining high performance in 
the “soft” aspect of the company’s profile (Assaf, Bubshait, Atiyah, & Al-Shahri, 2001).  
These might include maintaining a safe working environment (reduces insurance rates), 
closely monitoring internal accounting practices (understand how much money is actually 
being spent on overhead), and maintaining a positive relationship with the banks (more 
favorable loan terms). 
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Contractor Growth 
Overhead itself is not a particularly “risky” financial cost consideration.  The 
challenge is that increased expenditures for overhead is almost always associated with 
company growth.  A study analyzed the sources of failure of more than 1,000 companies 
and found that growth in and of itself was not the source of their failures, but strongly 
associated with it.  The study identified that, “success in the construction industry, even for 
very long periods, doesn't guarantee continuing success. In fact, the study indicates clearly 
that every change in a successful organization, particularly growth, creates a period of risk 
in spite of all previous successes…” (Schleifer et al., 2014, p. 3)).  Many of the 
organizations expanded their operations into unfamiliar areas, size or types of work solely 
for the sake of enlarging their sales volume.  The driving factor for increased growth is 
often the result of contractors’ need to sustain their overhead costs (Assaf et al., 2001; 
Schleifer, 2009). 
 
OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
Defining Construction Overhead 
AACE International defines overhead as, “a cost or expense inherent in the 
performing of an operation, (e.g., engineering, construction, operating, or manufacturing) 
which cannot be charged to or identified with a part of the work, product or asset and, 
therefore, must be allocated on some arbitrary base believed to be equitable, or handled as 
a business expense independent of the volume of production” (10S-90: Cost Engineering 
Terminology, 2012).  Overhead may also be referred to as indirect costs, and generally 
covers all costs not specifically categorized as subcontracts, material, equipment, and labor.  
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Table 2 summarizes various the dichotomous (overhead and not overhead) definitions for 
construction costs. 
 
Table 2. 
Summary of Construction Cost Definitions 
Researchers Direct cost definition Indirect (overhead) cost definitions 
Ahuja & Campbell, 
1988 
Items that specifically are included in 
the final project outcome, such as labor, 
material, equipment, and supplies. 
Anything that is not part of the 
finished product, including contractor 
overhead costs, profit, contingencies, 
etc. 
 
Palmer, Coombs, & 
Smith, 1995 
Any costs which can somehow be tied 
back to a specific job. 
All other costs not included in the 
direct cost. 
 
Pratt, 2010 Material, labor, or equipment as they 
are specifically associated with the 
quantity takeoff. 
Costs needed for the overall 
facilitation of the project’s 
completion. 
 
Regardless of how the various types of construction costs are defined, it’s important 
to understand that overhead expenses present a very real cost to the contractor.  However, 
quantifying these costs can be challenging.  Overhead costs were formally recognized in 
the federal case, Herbt M. Baruch Corporation v United States, (1941).  The Court ruled 
that contractors are allowed to recover damages from stop work orders, specifically for 
their overhead costs.  However, in order to claim these damages the contractor must prove 
that the delays were of an unknown duration, and that they could not recover these costs in 
another manner (Ibbs, Baker, & Burckhardt, 2015).  Contactors often have concurrent jobs 
ongoing, which makes assigning the impact on corporate overhead cost from a single job’s 
delay extremely difficult (Ernstrom & Essler, 1982). 
In essence, the contractor seeking damages must show that they had to devote time 
resources, at the expense of other projects, to resolve or respond to the owner-caused delays 
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of the problem project.  Further exacerbating the issue of accurate overhead cost estimate 
is that, “…persons supplying information have a vested interest in the project’s success 
and contractors are often confident, risk-taking entrepreneurs by inclination.  They want to 
believe that their cash-flow problem is minor and transitory.” (Schleifer, 1981, p. 19). 
 
Quantification of Overhead Costs 
The key to understanding and costing-out overhead expenses is that at its core, 
overhead is an activity-based accounting function (Dale & Bevington, 1989).  In order to 
manage overhead, these activities need to be closely monitored and adjusted over time.  
The consequence of not actively managing overhead is a loss of profitability, specifically 
through a reduction in retained earnings.  Furthermore, unchecked overhead grows over 
time very much to the surprise of the unsuspecting business owner (Schleifer et al., 2014; 
Snodgrass, 1991).  This increase in overhead especially happens during times of significant 
market growth as the business expands and its internal processes become more complex 
(Assaf et al., 2001; Blaxill & Hout, 1991; Schleifer, 2009). 
At a corporate level, Norfleet (2007) recommends that contractors use the same rate 
of overhead allocation across all projects, regardless of the external competitive pressures 
a company may face.  Per-project overhead rates are difficult to manage, and rarely do they 
sufficiently capture the true overhead costs.  Even if a contractor does use a single overhead 
percentage allocation, many of them do not accurate estimate their overhead and profit 
costs (Plebankiewicz & Leśniak, 2013).  Many contractors have structured their overhead 
as a fixed (or near-fixed) cost that does not rapidly respond to the normal cyclical nature 
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of the construction market (Schleifer, 2009).  In short, there is a need to standardize how 
overhead costs are developed and estimated (Hegazy & Moselhi, 1995). 
 
Managing Overhead Costs 
A contractor’s ability to successfully manage their overhead is directly tied to their 
profitability.  One study found that many contractors inaccurately quantified overhead 
costs as direct job costs (Holland & Hobson, 1999).  One of the significant drawbacks in 
quantifying overhead costs as job costs is that these overhead cost are then treated as such.  
That is, a contractor might assume that if they have fewer jobs, or perhaps can minimize 
these “direct” job costs, they can therefore minimize overhead costs. 
Understanding contractors’ perceptions on why they choose to pursue new work 
provides some inferences on their financial structure.  A survey of more than 200 
contractors found that the second-highest rated reason contractors pursue new work is their 
“need for work” (highest rated being the “type of job”), while the 28th reason being “general 
overhead” (Ahmad & Minkarah, 1988).  Interestingly, “potential for profitability of the 
job” or anything similar was identified by the respondents.  While this is a single study of 
a select group of contractors, it sheds some light on how the contractors typically approach 
their decisions to pursue work.  On its surface, these responses may seem logical and are 
probably the typical mindset of many companies: if the company does not have any jobs, 
they should go out and get new work.  However, understanding what is driving this “need” 
has profound implications on contractors’ reasons for pursuing such work.  Some have 
argued that contractors’ need for new work is primarily caused by their fixed and ever-
25 
increasing overhead levels (Jaselskis, E., Kurtenbach, J., & Forrest, J., 2002; Schleifer, 
2014a). 
One consistent theme in the literature is that the outsourcing of certain overhead 
functions can be very effective in managing these types of costs (Jaselskis, E. et al., 2002; 
Oviedo-Haito, Jiménez, Cardoso, & Pellicer, 2014; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Quinn & 
Hillmer, 1995).  The primary benefit in outsourcing these functions is that it allows 
companies to maintain their core people and assets.  It also increases their flexibility in 
responding to challenging market conditions by uncoupling their need for overhead (and 
therefore the need for new work).  Also, managing indirect project-level costs may lead to 
better project cost and quality outcomes, as it encourages the team to holistically evaluate 
the project and involve key players in project planning (Becker, Jaselskis, & El-Gafy, 
2014). 
At the core of this issue is culture and overall level of flexibility of the company.  
Blaxill & Hout (1991) suggest that there are generally three types of companies: 
bureaucratic (centralized structure), niche (nimble, few product lines), and robust (best of 
both).  The primary differentiating factor of robust companies is their overhead structure.  
Bureaucratic companies typically spend more money on overhead, per unit of sales, than 
any of the other company types.  While it is true that these bureaucratic “old-guard”-type 
companies can leverage economies of scale, their overhead costs have grown so 
tremendously over time that they are hardly competitive.  However, this is not to say that 
the elimination of staff positions, for instance is needed to cut costs.  In some cases, just a 
reorganization of the work flow can yield significant benefits. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
The researcher conducted extensive educational and project support efforts in the 
State of Minnesota with multiple public agencies as they tested the value-based model on 
their construction projects.  The first agency within the State to test the VBM was a large 
public university.  The University’s Associate Vice President (AVP) of Capital Planning 
and Project Management attended a presentation given by one of the researcher’s 
colleagues.  The AVP identified that the University had challenges with project 
performance and transparency – the University was currently in litigation on more than 
$17M in claims with its contractors.  The AVP decided to use the value-based model to 
resolve the issues, and attempt to increase the University’s level of transparency and 
organizational agility. 
When the University started piloting VBM in 2005, all Minnesotan municipalities 
required legislative authority to deviate from the traditional low bid award process on 
construction projects; however, the University had an exception to this requirement and 
did not require legislative approval to use the value-based model.  The University piloted 
the process on eight projects and received promising results: the projects were awarded 13 
percent below budget and finished with 0.4 percent contractor change orders, and 0.9 
percent contractor schedule delays.  Over the next two years, the University rapidly 
expanded its use of the VBM to more complex projects. 
During this period of expansion, the construction industry reported that they were 
more profitable on the University’s value-based projects and wanted other agencies 
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throughout the State to start using the approach.  Therefore, the labor unions lobbied the 
State’s legislature to permit other entities’ use the VBM or “best value” contracting 
approach, which resulted in the passing of 2007 Minn. Gen. Laws. ch. 16C, § 28 (see 
Thomson, Becker, & Wieland, 2007 for additional details about the law and related 
legislation).  The law allowed for expansion of VBM throughout the State in three phases, 
and also required that no agency may use VBM on more than one project annually or 20 
percent of all its projects during these initial three phases.  Table 3 shows when various 
types of public agencies were permitted to use the best value approach under the new law. 
 
Table 3 
Public Agencies’ Phased Implementation of the Minnesota Best Value Law 
Phase (Year) State 
Agencies 
Counties Cities School Districts Other Political 
Subdivisions 
One (2007) All All All Highest 25% enrollment of 
students in State 
None 
Two (2009) All All All Highest 50% enrollment of 
students in State 
All 
Three (2010) All All All All All 
 
With the best value legislation in place and through word of mouth, several public 
agencies contacted the researcher for educational training and project support.  Table 4 
identifies the year in which each agency started working with the researcher, the year in 
which research concluded (if applicable), and the estimated population of each agency’s 
constituents when their research efforts commenced (the University and School District 
populations are the estimated number of enrolled students).  The “Research Conclusion” 
column shows the last year of formal project support with the researcher (however, the 
agencies may still be using the VBM in one form or another). 
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Table 4 
Public Agency Value-Based Implementation Dates 
Public Agency Research Start Research Conclusion Estimated Population1 
Public University 1 2005 2011 46,000 
City 1 2008 2015 33,000 
City 2 2009 On-going 103,000 
County 1 2009 2013 144,000 
School District 1 2009 On-going 16,000 
Public Utility 1 2010 2011 50,000 
School District 2 2010 On-going 12,000 
County 2 2011 2012 1,169,000 
1Data obtained from US Census and School Enrollment data 
 
The researcher answered the following research questions: 
1. In what ways do the agile tools embedded within the Value-Based Model 
increase public accountability? 
2. What are the associated costs or savings of implementing the agile concepts? 
3. And finally, do project outcomes (schedule and cost) vary by the type of public 
agency that uses the Value-Based Model? 
 
AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
Research Objective 
The research objective of this study assesses the construction industry’s changes to 
corporate overhead costs, specifically as a result of the Great Recession.  The researcher 
conducted a survey that solicited information about the magnitude of overhead cuts (if any) 
according to a set of different overhead expense categories. 
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Overhead Reductions as a Result of the Recession 
Survey Development 
This section presents the process used to identify contractor overhead reduction 
during the recession according various demographic factors.  The researcher developed a 
survey instrument as shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Overhead Survey Development and Distribution 
 
The researcher designed the survey so that it could be completed in around five 
minutes or less in an effort to increase the response rate and accuracy of responses.  The 
survey was divided into two parts: the first requested the respondent to classify their 
company’s percentage reduction from a set of typical overhead categories, from their 
perspective within the company (i.e., local, region, corporate).  The second part of the 
survey collected demographic information about the respondents, including estimated 
annual revenue, number of full-time employees, and business sector.  The wording of the 
demographic questions as well as their categorical values came from AGC’s 2014 National 
Construction Outlook Survey and the US Census of Businesses (see The Associated 
General Contractors of America, 2014).  Both the pilot survey and the final survey were 
distributed through an online system called LimeSurvey.  See Appendix 1 for a copy of the 
online survey. 
Survey 
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The researchers were focused on company-level indirect non-construction costs 
(Becker et al., 2014) to assess, at a corporate level, the changes companies made to 
overhead.  The initial list of overhead categories came from five sources: Holland & 
Hobson's (1999) classification of various overhead costs from an architect/engineer’s 
perspective; AACE’s list of typical list construction overhead categories (Norfleet, 2007); 
Cilensek's (1991) identification of project-level overhead costs; and Dale's (1989) piece on 
general business accounting overhead categories.  The researchers then selected the 
overhead categories that were most in line with construction corporate level overhead costs.  
Next, this list of overhead categories and percentage reduction levels was presented to 17 
construction industry professionals.  They each had approximately 20+ years’ of 
experience in the industry, and held executive-level positions in their companies.  They 
made recommendations to the overhead categories, percentage reduction levels, 
demographic questions, and survey readability.  Their changes were implemented, and the 
survey was then distributed to the following six groups (a total distribution of about 2,000 
– 5,000 people), and the members of each group received two reminder emails: 
 Arizona Builders Alliance (ABA) – all members 
 Associated General Contractors (AGC) – via chapters through the US. 
 National Roofing Contractors Association (NRCA) – national distribution to all 
members 
 Sheet Metal & Air Conditioning Contractors’ National Association 
(SMACNA) – national distribution to all members 
 Roofing manufacturer’s product applicators (roofing contractors) – national 
distribution 
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 Contacts database of a university construction management program. 
 
Data Collection 
This section presents descriptive statistics of the survey responses on the overhead 
reductions and demographic characteristics.  Numerical results of several statistical tests 
are presented along with significant findings to understand the relationship between 
industry-level overhead reductions and four variables, namely: 
1. Number of full-time employees (FTEs) 
2. Annual revenue 
3. Primary sector of business 
4. Trade of work 
 
A Spearman’s rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between the 
overhead reductions and revenue and number of full-time employees.  A one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to identify if the overhead reductions were different 
for different trades of work, as well as the respondent’s primary sector of business.  One 
requirement of an ANOVA is homogeneity of variances across the different groups (trade, 
sector, annual revenue, and number of full-time employees).  The researchers used 
Levene’s test of equality of variances, whose null hypothesis states that the population 
variance is equal for each group (Levene, 1960).  When the variance was not equal (that is, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of Levene’s test), Welch’s ANOVA was used (Welch, 1947).  
For any statistically significant results, Tukey post hoc (equal variances) and Games-
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Howell (unequal variances) analyses were used.  Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) version 21.0 was used to conduct the analyses. 
 
OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
Research Objectives 
The challenge with the construction industry’s typical approach of using a 
percentage or index to estimate overhead costs is not the method itself.  In fact, it is quite 
efficient when accurately calculated.  Rather, the challenge is that by using this approach 
many companies do not intentionally evaluate, on a regular basis, the activities driving 
their overhead cost.  The recent recession forced many contractors to reduce their overhead, 
or face bankruptcy (or both in many cases).  Therefore, the extreme and long-lasting impact 
of the recession offers insights into construction companies, especially when viewing 
management overhead as a bellwether of contractors’ preferences in severe financial 
situations.  The objectives of this research study were the following: 
1. As a direct result of the recession, empirically quantify the categorical corporate 
/ company-level overhead reductions in terms of both magnitude and breadth 
across companies. 
2. Suggest approaches to minimize the negative financial impact of future 
economic declines. 
 
Reduction of Construction Overhead Expenses 
The following sections provide details on how the research study was conducted.  
This section is laid out as follows: 
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1. Description of the data collection instrument and method. 
2. Summary of the primary data analysis techniques. 
3. Presentation of descriptive statistics for the relevant data collected. 
4. Summary of results for the two primary data analyses conducted: (1) 
correlations between reduction of the overhead categories and respondents’ 
demographics, and (2) statistical testing of the reduction distributions across the 
overhead categories, as well as post-hoc analyses. 
 
Data Analysis Techniques 
Several additional analyses were conducted on the data from the construction 
industry overhead survey.  A Spearman’s rank-order correlation was run to assess the 
relationship between the overhead reductions and revenue and number of full-time 
employees.  The researchers also used the Kruskal-Wallis H test (K-W), which is a 
nonparametric version of an analysis of variance (ANOVA), specifically designed for 
ordinal dependent variables.  K-W tests whether the distribution of values is equal among 
the different overhead categories.  If the groups being analyzed have the same variance, 
the alternate hypothesis is, “the distributions of the values are not the same”.  However, if 
there is unequal variance, the alternate hypothesis becomes, “the mean ranks of the groups 
are not equal” (see Vargha & Delaney (1998) for a detailed discussion on this issue, and 
other intricacies, of the Krusal-Wallis H test). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
Data Characteristics 
The researcher collected data on 415 construction projects from 2005 to 2015 at 
eight different public agencies, totaling $561.47M in project value.  The researcher 
obtained data on contractor selection processes, pre-planning documentation, and project 
performance through research partnerships with each agency.  The projects ranged in size 
from $7,000 to $71.6M (mean = $1.4M, SD = $6.2M) in all major vertical building trades 
(General Construction, Mechanical, Electrical, and Roofing).  The projects had durations 
ranging from one week to 2.7 years (mean = 128 calendar days, SD = 141 calendar days).  
Table 5 provides a summary of the projects and their overall cost and schedule 
performance. 
Table 5 shows the actual project cost (rows 10 – 14) and schedule (rows 15 – 19) 
changes.  The “Percent Awarded Over Budget” (also known as the change order rate) was 
calculated by summing the total cost changes attributed to a given source and dividing by 
the project’s contract cost amount.  Likewise, the “Percent Delayed” (schedule delay rate) 
was calculated by summing the total number of days increased or decreased, and dividing 
by the project’s contract duration in calendar days as measured from final payment date. 
The overall cost change order rate was 6.9 percent (a $39M increase from the total 
awarded project value of $561.5M).  The data shows almost all of the changes ($33M) 
were due to owner-directed changes (i.e., increased / changed scope, delays).  Even more 
interesting is that the total contractor cost changes were in the form of savings or value-
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engineering ideas, totaling $51,650 across all the projects (in other words, contractor-
attributed change order rate was negative).  The remaining $6M of changes were from 
design errors or unforeseen conditions.  Schedule changes had similarly distributed sources 
of delay, with the overall delay rate being 35.2 percent (18,666 days increase from the total 
awarded project duration of 53,014 days).  Almost all schedule delays (13,589 days) were 
due to the owner, with the contractor contributing a much smaller amount (1,009 days 
delayed across all projects). 
 
 Table 5 
Summary of Project Performance Information by Public Agency 
No Criteria City 1 City 2 County 
1 
County 
2 
Public 
University 1 
Public 
Utility 1 
School 
District 1 
School 
District 2 
TOTAL 
1 Total # of Projects 5 9 1 10 345 2 39 4 415 
2 Smallest Project Value ($M) 0.05 0.37 12.36 0.25 0.01 0.50 0.10 0.47 0.01 
3 Largest Project Value ($M) 2.22 71.64 12.36 21.66 64.14 1.05 3.29 25.99 71.64 
4 Mean Project Value ($M) 0.99 12.38 12.36 3.74 0.94 0.78 0.98 7.49 1.35 
5 Total Project Value ($M) 4.94 111.46 12.36 37.38 325.66 1.55 38.13 29.97 561.47 
6 Shortest Project Duration 127  150  275  125  7  95  67  85  7  
7 Longest Project Duration 730  910  275  575  986  115  527  519  986  
8 Mean Project Duration 290  386  275  248  105  105  203  257  128  
9 Total Project Duration 1,452  3,478  275  2,477  36,175  210  7,921  1,026  53,014  
10 % Over Awarded Budget 0.8% 0.9% 4.4% 0.4% 10.7% 2.1% 4.7% 2.5% 6.9% 
11       Owner 0.2% 0.3% 1.2% 0.1% 9.8% 0.1% 1.3% 0.4% 5.9% 
12       Contractor 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
13       Designer 0.0% 0.6% 2.5% 0.2% 0.3% 1.6% 2.2% 1.6% 0.6% 
14       Unforeseen 0.6% 0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 1.3% 0.6% 0.4% 
15 % Delayed 5.4% 10.4% 12.7% 10.7% 47.7% 209.0% 1.5% 11.0% 35.2% 
16       Owner 2.9% 6.2% 5.5% 2.1% 35.9% 81.9% 0.5% 7.4% 25.6% 
17       Contractor 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 0.1% 3.2% 1.9% 
18       Designer 0.0% 1.2% 7.3% 6.7% 4.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 3.5% 
19       Unforeseen 2.5% 0.1% 0.0% 1.9% 5.0% 127.1% 0.5% 0.0% 4.2% 
20 Satisfaction Rating – Contractor 9.7 9.6 8.8 N/A 9.5 8.1 10.0 8.9 9.5 
21 Satisfaction Rating – VBM 10.0 8.5 10.0 N/A 9.6 8.0 9.9 9.7 9.6 
22 Total Number of Surveys 1 2 1 0 214 1 26 3 248 
23 Total value of litigation ($M) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 Total number of bid protests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
Descriptive Statistics 
A total of 437 valid responses were received over a period of two months (January 
13, 2015 to March 19, 2015).  43 responses were excluded from this study, primarily due 
to the respondents’ identification as a non-contractor (architect, facility owner, 
manufacturer, etc.).  While each question was optional, nearly all of the respondents 
provided an answer to each question, including the background and demographic 
information.  The average response time in completing the survey was 4.8 minutes.  The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6 (each overhead expense category), Table 7 
(annual revenue and number of employees), Table 8 (construction trade), and Table 9 
(business sector).  The overhead reductions were coded as follows: 0 = “0% (no 
reductions)”, 1 = “1 – 10%”, 2 = “11 – 25%”, 3 = “26 – 50%”, 4 = “51 – 75%”, and 5 = 
“More than 75%”. 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Overhead Reduction Categories 
Overhead category Count of 
responses 
Mean Median Mode Standard 
deviation 
Bonuses 425 2.233 2 0 1.940 
Company functions (parties, etc.) 410 2.239 2 0 1.833 
Charitable or holiday gifts 426 1.988 2 0 1.703 
Training or education 432 1.021 0 0 1.412 
Contributions to retirement plans, etc. 424 1.297 0 0 1.853 
Corporate officer’s salary 418 1.077 0 0 1.367 
Business development or accounting staff 429 0.854 0 0 1.375 
Travel or company vehicles 425 1.228 1 0 1.438 
Home office: space (i.e., rent) 408 0.398 0 0 0.919 
Home office: benefits paid by company 400 0.511 0 0 1.051 
Home office: number of hours worked 402 0.359 0 0 0.879 
Home office: staff salary 403 0.492 0 0 0.957 
Home office: various insurance costs 392 0.450 0 0 0.962 
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Figure 5 presents the distribution of overhead reduction, individually for each 
individual responses to each category.  While the most common response was “0% (none)”, 
92 percent of the respondents reduced overhead within an average of 5.5 categories of 
overhead (SD = 3.42), by an average of a 1.14 reduction (SD = .96). 
 
 
Figure 5.  Histogram of Cumulative Overhead Reductions Levels for All Categories 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Respondent Demographics 
Demographic criteria Count of 
responses 
Mean Median Mode Standard 
deviation 
Annual Revenue 429 2.466 2 1 1.618 
Number of full-time employees 424 3.731 4 3 1.476 
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Table 8 
Relative Frequency Distribution for Respondents’ Construction Trade 
Demographic criteria Percentage of Respondents 
Electrical 5.3 
General Construction 30.6 
Mechanical / Plumbing 22.2 
Roofing 30.8 
Other 11.1 
 
Table 9 
Relative Frequency Distribution for Respondents’ Primary Business Sector 
Demographic criteria Percentage of Respondents 
Highway 2.1 
Hospital / Higher Education 16.0 
K-12 School 7.2 
Manufacturing 6.2 
Power 1.0 
Private Office 10.0 
Public Building 14.1 
Retail, Warehouse, Lodging 8.4 
Water / Sewer 2.4 
Other 32.7 
 
Reliability Testing 
The researchers used the mean of the 13 overhead categories as an overall measure 
of overhead reduction.  The overhead categories had a high level of internal consistency 
(DeVellis, 2011; Kline, 2004), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.889.  Table 10 presents a 
summary of the statistical tests conducted in the next section. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Statistical Tests 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Hypothesis 
test statistic 
p-value 
(2-
sided) 
Correlation p-value 
(2-
sided) 
Statistical test 
Number of 
FTEs 
Mean OH 
reduction 
6.371 < 0.005 -0.198 < 0.005 
Welch’s 
F/Spearman 
Number of 
FTEs 
# categories 
cut 
2.621 0.024 -0.123 0.011 ANOVA/Spearman 
Annual 
revenue 
Mean OH 
reduction 
9.231 < 0.005 -0.184 < 0.01 
Welch’s 
F/Spearman 
Annual 
revenue 
# categories 
cut 
3.001 0.011 -0.112 < 0.05 ANOVA/Spearman 
Sector 
Mean OH 
reduction 
1.786 0.239 0.028 0.239 Welch’s F/eta2 
Sector 
# categories 
cut 
0.701 0.708 0.015 0.708 ANOVA/eta2 
Trade 
Mean OH 
reduction 
3.107 0.018 0.028 0.020 Welch’s F/eta2 
Trade 
# categories 
cut 
2.046 0.087 0.020 0.087 ANOVA/eta2 
 
Group Differences and Correlations 
The researchers were interested in assessing overall overhead reductions across the 
construction industry as a result of the recession.  The two primary outcome measures of 
overhead changes were the magnitude of overhead reduction, and the number of different 
categories that companies reduced.  The greatest drivers of overhead reduction appear to 
be company size (as measured by annual revenue and the number of full-time employees).  
Note that, as expected, there is strong collinearity between a company’s FTE and revenue 
(rs = .810, p < .0005).  Figure 6 is a dual-axis histogram that shows the number of 
respondents (left y-axis) according to their company size, and the mean overhead reduction 
for each company size category (right y-axis).  Likewise, Figure 7 presents the mean 
overhead reduction by the number of full-time employees.  Figure 8 and 9 present similar 
results, but for the number of categories reduced.  As indicated by these figures and an 
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inspection the correlation results, there was a weak negative correlation between company 
size and overhead reduction. 
 
Figure 6.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Frequency Distribution, Annual Revenue 
 
 
Figure 7.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Frequency Distribution, Number of FTEs 
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Figure 8.  Mean # of Categories Cut by Frequency Distribution of Annual Revenue 
 
Figure 9.  Mean # of Categories Cut by Frequency Distribution of Number of FTEs 
 
Next, the researcher analyzed business sector overhead reductions (see Figures 10 
and 11), and found that there were no statistically significant differences in overhead 
43 
reduction, both in terms of the mean reduction, and the number of categories reduced.  
Also, all construction trades had high levels of variability across measures of company 
size, with exception to roofing, which made almost no changes regardless of a roofer’s 
overall size.   
 
Figure 10.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Revenue and Construction Trade 
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Figure 11.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Number of FTEs and Construction Trade 
 
The researcher also studied the overhead changes by business sectors (see Figures 
12 and 13).  There was homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene's test for equality 
of variances (p = .416).  However, there were no statistically significant differences in the 
number of overhead categories reduced between the different business sectors, F(4, 410) = 
2.046, p = .087. 
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Figure 12.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Number of FTEs and Construction Trade 
 
 
Figure 13.  Mean Overhead Reduction by Number of FTEs and Construction Trade 
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OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
Data Findings 
Overhead Category Correlations 
Table 11 presents the Spearman (rho) correlations between each overhead category, 
and the company size demographics (annual revenue and number of full-time employees 
(FTE)), the respondent’s mean overhead reduction (across all categories), and the number 
of different categories where reductions were made. 
 
Table 11 
Correlations Between Overhead Categories and Respondents’ Demographics 
Overhead category Annual 
Revenue 
FTE 
Count 
Mean Overhead 
Reduction 
Number of 
Categories 
Reduced 
Bonuses -.120* -.092 .769** .630** 
Company functions (parties, etc.) -.136** -.144** .797** .662** 
Charitable or holiday gifts -.140** -.168** .795** .666** 
Training or education -.051 -.076 .693** .678** 
Contributions to retirement plans, etc. -.116* -.107* .623** .582** 
Corporate officer’s salary -.187** -.178** .602** .587** 
Business development or accounting 
staff 
-.081 -.120* .659** .667** 
Travel or company vehicles -.164** -.198** .678** .646** 
Home office: space (i.e., rent) -.022 -.030 .425** .500** 
Home office: benefits paid by company -.057 -.082 .518** .584** 
Home office: number of hours worked -.112* -.077 .424** .482** 
Home office: staff salary -.036 -.063 .539** .615** 
Home office: various insurance costs -.076 -.107* .437** .538** 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
The highest correlation values between measures of company sizes and overhead 
categories were with “Corporate officer’s salary”, “Travel or company vehicles”, 
“Charitable or holiday gifts”, and “Company functions (parties, etc.)”.  Stated another way, 
larger companies (as measured by annual revenue or number of full-time employees) 
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tended to reduce these four areas more, as compared to other overhead categories.  
Conversely, reductions to “Training or education”, “Business development or accounting 
staff”, “Home office: space”, and “Home office: staff salary” had negligible and 
statistically insignificant correlations with the company’s size. 
The researcher also analyzed correlations between the individual overhead 
categories and overhead reduction, in terms of both the magnitude of reduction and the 
number of categories reduced.  There were very strong and statistically significant 
correlations between each individual overhead category’s reduction and the respondent’s 
overall reduction in all categories.  In general, larger reductions in “Company Functions 
(parties, etc.)”, “Charitable or holiday gifts”, and “Bonuses” were most strongly correlated 
with the respondent’s overall level of overhead reduction.  Furthermore, companies with 
larger cuts in “Training or education” tended to reduce overhead across a higher number 
categories.  In other words, companies who were willing (or forced to) make cuts in these 
areas usually reduced overhead across the board. 
 
Differences of Overhead Reduction Distributions Across Overhead Categories 
It appears that construction companies do not perceive all overhead the same, 
otherwise the researchers would expect to see nearly identical reductions for all overhead 
categories.  Figure 14 presents a histogram of the distribution of overhead cost reductions 
by category.  The categories are sorted with the areas having the most frequent response of 
“No” reductions listed on top.  A visual inspection of this figure shows that there appear to 
be approximately three groups of overhead category reductions: (1) company functions, 
charitable or holiday gifts, and bonuses, (2) travel or company vehicles, corporate officer’s 
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salary, training or education, contributions to retirement plans, and business development 
or accounting staff, and (3) all categories of home office expenses.  The percentage of 
respondents in each of these three groups reported no reductions are as follows: Group (1): 
27.6%, Group (2): 52.9%, and Group (3): 75.1%. 
  
          Figure 14.  Distribution of Overhead Cost Reductions.
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Next, the researcher conducted Kruskal-Wallis H tests to identify if there were 
statistically significant differences for the overhead reduction distributions within each the 
three groups previously identified.  Table 12 presents the test statistics for each group.  The 
overhead reduction distributions for Groups (2) and (3) were statistically significantly 
different.  Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.  This post-hoc analysis revealed that 
“Travel or company vehicles” in Group (2) and “Home Office: number of hours worked” 
for Group (3) had statistically significant differences in their overhead reduction 
distributions, compared with the other overhead categories in their respective groups.  
When removing these two outlier categories, Group (2) and Group (3) likely did not have 
different distributions of overhead expenses within each group. 
 
Table 12 
Kruskal-Wallis H Test Statistics 
Independent variable Dependent 
variable 
H statistic N p-value 
(2-sided) 
Group (1) Overhead 
Reduction 
3.991 1,261 0.136 
Group (2) Overhead 
Reduction 
19.483 2,128 < .001 
Group (2) – without travel Overhead 
Reduction 
4.737 1,703 0.192 
Group (3) Overhead 
Reduction 
12.316 2,005 0.015 
Group (3) – without # of hours 
worked 
Overhead 
Reduction 
3.024 1,603 0.388 
 
The researcher then studied the correlations between the different flexibility groups 
and the correlations across all of the overhead categories.  Table 13 presents the mean 
Spearman correlation of each overhead flexibility group and the mean Spearman 
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correlation for all other categories, the p values from independent-samples t-tests between 
the various group combinations, and the standard deviation of each comparison group.  
Table 14 presents the Spearman correlations among the thirteen categories of overhead.   
 
Table 13 
Correlation Analysis of Overhead Category Groupings 
 Standard 
Deviation 
Group Mean 
Correlation 
(A) 
Mean Correlation –
other categories 
(B) 
t-test p 
value 
(A) (B) 
Group (1) 0.777 0.370 0.003 0.088 0.097 
Group (2) 0.441 0.517 0.048 0.054 0.160 
Group (2) – without travel 0.411 0.497 0.014 0.038 0.148 
Group (3) 0.436 0.505 0.047 0.102 0.119 
Group (3) – without # of hours 0.475 0.505 0.252 0.088 0.119 
 
Spearman correlations are not normally distributed, so a simple mean of the raw 
Spearman correlations would produce biased results.  Instead, the researcher applied 
Fisher's (1915) Z transformation to each correlation, produced means on the transformed 
values, and then inverse-transformed these means (back to a Spearman correlation value).  
While this approach is designed for Pearson (r) correlations, the transformation produces 
similar results while also minimizing Type I errors, as compared to other transformation 
methods (Myers & Sirois, 2004). 
The greatest difference in correlations appears between Group (1) (ρ = 0.777) and 
all of the other groups (ρ = 0.370).  While the correlations for the ‘other’ categories in 
groups (2) and (3) were higher compared to the groups themselves, the p-values themselves 
are not extraordinarily small.  Overall, the average correlation for the groups was ρ = 0.555, 
and ρ = 0.457 for all other groups. 
 Table 14 
Spearman Correlations Between Corporate Overhead Categories 
Overhead Categories 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.  Company functions (parties, etc.) -              
2.  Charitable or holiday gifts .706** -            
3. Bonuses .623** .619** -           
4. Travel or company vehicles .510** .495** .442** -          
5. Corporate officer’s salary .375** .399** .400** .400** -         
6. Training or education .542** .563** .488** .416** .353** -        
7. Contributions to retirement plans .380** .438** .455** .363** .416** .399** -       
8. Business development .439** .471** .429** .492** .467** .446** .380** -      
9. Home office: benefits paid .279** .303** .251** .355** .238** .397** .314** .385** -     
10. Home office: staff salary .302** .342** .308** .347** .358** .422** .296** .378** .510** -    
11. Home office: insurance costs .231** .251** .219** .264** .207** .321** .235** .269** .526** .417** -   
12. Home office: space (i.e., rent) .233** .234** .211** .291** .213** .323** .218** .411** .454** .396** .339** -  
13. Home office: # of hours worked .274** .279** .215** .294** .273** .340** .198** .268** .310** .484** .322** .310** - 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
5
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
Evaluating the Research Questions 
Research Question 1 – Impact of Organizational Agility on Public Accountability 
The researcher defines “increases” in public accountability as the availability of 
performance information and relative satisfaction of the public agents (acting on behalf of 
their taxpaying constituents).  First, the data shown in Table 5 are the actual representation 
of funds allocated to the public projects.  These results are especially useful within the 
context of the Legal accountability framework.  The performance information provides 
external third-party agencies with quantifiable data that they can use to communicate with 
constituents, identify areas of improvement, or make more informed funding allocation on 
future efforts.  Tax-payers or private businesses might also use the results to adjust their 
preferences when considering which public entity they would prefer to work with (Market 
accountability). 
The researcher also measured the public agency’s level of satisfaction of the Value-
Based Model itself and the contractors’ level of performance.  The researcher views the 
public agents’ satisfaction level as a surrogate of how well the agility tools in VBM 
increase public accountability.  At the conclusion of each project, the researcher solicited 
a closeout survey from the public entity’s project manager.  A total of 248 surveys were 
collected, which are summarized in Rows 20 – 22 of table 4.  The project managers were 
asked to rate eight performance criteria on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 representing that 
they were very satisfied.  The project managers’ overall satisfaction with the contractors 
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was rated 9.5 out of 10 (row 20), while the VBM itself was rated 9.6 out of 10 (row 21).  
Furthermore, the University (as well as all of the other public agencies in this study) did 
not report any litigation or bid protests as a result of using the Value-Based Model. 
The researcher interviewed several of the public agency’s directors and their 
contractors.  Their comments highlight how the VBM has increased their overall level of 
performance by implementing the agile concepts: 
 “I like the transparency aspect of VBM.  One of the biggest challenges I face in 
a public institutional setting is ensuring that we provide opportunity for many 
different vendors – VBM helps us increase opportunity for the high performers.  
Another key part of the process is preplanning –in the past, we were not very 
good at preplanning, we like to jump into a project and push it through the 
system quickly.  Now that we preplan, it gives us that opportunity to align 
resources, properly assess the risk, and create a structure so that the project has 
the best opportunity for a successful outcome.  While learning the new 
paradigm of VBM has been challenging, we’ve found that once you put 
accountability into the equation, guess what?  People perform.”  [Associate 
Vice President, University 1] 
 “The biggest differences between the VBM and low-bid is that in low bid, 
you’re getting a low number, you’re getting low performance, and you’re 
getting low quality.  Sometimes it works out, sometimes it doesn’t.  I feel much 
more comfortable with the VBM process, where I have little to no change 
orders, and sometimes even a credit back from the contractors.” [Coordinator 
of Design and Construction Services, School District 1] 
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 “Phase 2 of the VBM (pre-planning) is extremely important as it helps 
everybody understand their role in the project and clarify the project’s overall 
intent.  During the pre-planning on our project, we reviewed the risk 
assessments of the general contractor and their prime subs, and there were some 
‘a-ha’ moments on where the project risk exists.”  [Facilities Director, School 
District 2] 
 “In the price-based system, our relationship with the general contractor was 
more oppositional than anything.  Now, there’s no longer fights after the 
contract award about, ‘You’re going to eat this cost’ because the teamwork is 
promoted before the contract award.  VBM increases transparency and there’s 
no need to hide anything from each other.” [Mechanical subcontractor awarded 
multiple VBM projects with City 2 and School District 1] 
  “VBM is a huge improvement over the old traditional process, where really the 
contractors were looking at what was the best for them. In the VBM, contractors 
are really looking at what’s in the best interest of the customer.”  [General 
Contractor Vice President, several projects at University 1] 
 
Research Question 2 – Costs of Implementing the Agile Concepts 
A common concern from public agencies when considering using the VBM is that 
the process will increase contractor bid prices.  This assumption is based on the perception 
that contractors who implement the agile concepts are costlier than those who do not – 
“you pay for what you get.”  While this might be true in other areas (i.e., commodities), 
the researcher propose that VBM does not greatly affect initial bid price, due to the 
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uniquely competitive nature associated with building construction.  On the contrary, the 
researcher identify that VBM projects actually have a lower lifecycle cost (as measured up 
to construction completion – building operation costs are not included due to lack of data).  
The researcher bases this claim on the two analyses discussed below: (1) VBM project 
performance versus Traditional low bid projects and (2) VBM project award values in 
relation to the allocated budgets. 
First, the researcher considered the total project costs of the VBM projects versus 
Traditional low bid, low accountability projects.  It is important to note that capturing cost 
and schedule performance results of low bid projects is inherently difficult.  The data 
sources are almost non-existent and any data provided is questionable.  In an effort to 
overcome this obstacle, the researcher obtained data from another study that measured 
performance of traditional low bid projects (see Lines et al., 2014 for a detailed analysis of 
the projects and results).  Lines’ dataset contained meticulously-collected performance data 
of 11 traditional low-bid construction projects (mean award value of $1.3M, SD = $1.2M) 
delivered by one region of a large federal agency.  While not a large dataset, this project 
data can help explain the relative performance of the Minnesotan VBM projects. 
The total cost increases with the Value-Based Model was about 5.9 percent, 
compared to 10.6 percent under the Traditional projects.  VBM project schedule increases 
were about 27.5 percent, compared to 67.9 percent in the Traditional environment.  An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare cost and schedule performance 
metrics under the VBM and Traditional project delivery environments.  With exception to 
the owner schedule deviations, there was a statistically significant difference in 
performance between VBM and Traditional projects (see Table 15).  Cost and schedule 
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changes on the VBM projects were about 57 percent less than the Traditional low bid 
increases.  The Value-based projects present a per-project savings of about $1.4M and 163 
calendar days.  This was calculated by applying the mean Traditional project cost and 
schedule performance increases to the mean Value-Based project cost and schedule values, 
and calculating the difference. 
 
Table 15 
t-test Results Comparing VBM and Traditional Cost and Schedule Changes 
 Best Value Traditional Projects t-value df 
Owner Cost Changes 5.9% 10.4% -2.47** 424 
Owner Schedule Changes 25.6% 50.8% -0.05 12 
Contractor Cost Changes 0.0% 0.2% 1.83* 71 
Contractor Schedule Changes 1.9% 17.1% -4.01** 424 
*p < 0.05.  **p < 0.01. 
 
Next, the researcher analyzed the initial cost proposals and final awarded contract 
amounts, with respect to the budgets, on just the Minnesota VBM projects.  The only 
projects analyzed were those that had a project budget included in the Request for Proposal, 
for a total of 382 valid cases.  Table 16 shows the total budgeted amount (row 1), initial 
cost proposal (row 2), and the awarded contract value of all projects (row 5).  It also shows 
the accepted total cost of additional value added ideas from the contractor (row 3), and 
other owner-direct scope changes prior to award (row 4).  The value-added ideas are 
developed by the contractor, and are anything above and beyond the project specifications 
that the contractor feels would improve the overall value to the owner. 
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The awarded contractor was the lowest bidder 53 percent of the time.  For the 
remaining 47 percent of projects (where the contractor was awarded a contract but not the 
lowest bidder) they were an average of 8 percent above the low bidder, but still an 
average of 7 percent below the budget. 
 
Table 16 
VBM Initial Cost Proposals and Final Contract Award 
No Criteria Value 
1 Total Budgeted Amount ($M) 544.27 
2 Total Initial Cost Proposal ($M) 530.19 
3 Total Cost of Value Added Ideas ($M) 4.89 
4 Total Cost of Owner-directed Changes 20.74 
5 Total Awarded Contract Value ($M) 555.83 
 
Research Question 3 – Performance Variation by Public Agency Type 
Finally, the researcher wanted to understand whether the performance results, and 
therefore propensity of implementing the agile tools, varied by the type of public agency.  
The researcher conducted an analysis of variance to identify if different types of public 
agencies had significance differential across cost and schedule changes (see Table 17).  The 
only statistically significant difference between public agency type was with owner 
schedule delays, F(4, 410) = 2.670, p = .032.  However, the strength of this relationship 
was negligible (η2 = .0025).  Therefore, cost and schedule performance do not appear to 
vary based on the type of public agency – overall project performance appears to be 
consistent across the different agency types. 
 
59 
Table 17 
Analysis of Variance for Cost and Schedule Performance 
 All Cities Counties Public 
Utilities 
School 
Districts 
Public 
University 
ANOVA 
F values 
ANOV
A η2 
Owner Cost 5.9% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.9% 9.8% 0.655 0.006 
Owner 
Schedule 
25.6% 5.3% 2.4% 81.9% 1.3% 35.9% 2.670* 0.025 
Contractor 
Cost 
0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.431 0.004 
Contractor 
Schedule 
1.9% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 0.841 0.008 
* p < 0.05. 
 
Study Limitations 
While the researcher has attempted to bring a certain level of robustness to the case 
study through an analysis of more than 400 projects, there are two significant limitations 
that the reader should be aware of.  Firstly, the researcher assumed that the contractors 
accurately reported all cost and schedule metrics, not only in terms of the actual values but 
also with regards to which party generated the change (owner, contactor, designer, or 
unforeseen).  The researcher attempted to ensure accuracy by establishing a feedback loop 
between the public agency’s project manager and the contractor.  The project managers 
were directed to verify that the performance reporting tools contained all project and 
schedule changes.  Performance metrics is one of the most difficult agility tools to begin 
using, for both the public owner and their non-governmental organizations. 
A second limitation is generalization of the reported results.  All Minnesota projects 
studied took place within an area of approximately 100 square miles.  This relatively small 
geographic area could introduce unique geopolitical or other demographic considerations 
that might affect the owner-contractor relationship. 
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AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
In a somewhat surprising result, the mean overhead deviates from its downward 
trend as company size increases.  In an effort to understand what might be causing this, 
Figures 15 and 16 show the distribution of the respondents’ business sectors by annual 
revenue and number of full-time employees.  A visual inspection of these bar charts reveals 
that the relative distribution of respondents’ business sectors remains rather consistent, 
with exception to Manufacturing.  In fact, the largest relative percentage of respondents 
identifying Manufacturing as their primary business sector is with companies’ whose 
annual revenue is $100.1M - $500M, and with 101 to 500 full-time employees – the same 
groups that had higher levels of overhead reductions (compared to smaller or larger 
companies). 
Furthermore, a review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census data found that 
Manufacturing spending declined by about $38B (about 50%), which was both absolutely 
and relatively higher than nearly all of the other business sectors in this study (the exception 
being Private Retail – spending declined there by about $40B).  Thus, one possible 
explanation for why the mean overhead reduction spikes for companies in the $100.1 to 
$500M range is that there was such a large decline in this sector that, companies were 
forced to cut more overhead costs than their similarly-sized peers in other sectors.  The 
researcher conducted an independent samples t-test to compare mean overhead reduction 
for respondents whose primary business sector is Manufacturing, and all other sectors (only 
those at the $100.1M - $500M level).  There was a significant difference in overhead 
reduction for Manufacturing sectors (M = 1.6, SD = .887) and all other sectors (M = 0906, 
SD = 0.6); t(38) = 2.281, p = 0.028.   
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Figure 15.  Relative Distribution of Business Sectors by Annual Revenue 
 
 
Figure 16.  Relative Distribution of Business Sectors by Number of FTEs 
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OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
These three results (visual inspection of the histogram in Figure 5, results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests, and the intergroup correlations) suggest that there are at least three 
different levels of flexibility for corporate overhead categories in construction 
organizations: (1) Completely Flexible, (2) Potentially Flexible, and (3) Inflexible.  
Completely Flexible overhead costs are those that, at the first signs of difficult market 
conditions, could be immediately reduced or eliminated.  Potentially Flexible are those that 
are the second layer of overhead reduction, and all potential reductions have been made in 
the Completely Flexible group.  Inflexible overhead expenses are those that would require 
substantial effort to reduce or eliminate, and should only be considered after all reductions 
have been made in the other flexible groups.  Table 18 summarizes the categories in each 
group as well as the descriptive statistics for each group. 
Note that “Travel or company vehicles” and “Home office: # of hours worked” are 
not included in any flexibility group.  Recall from the Kruskal-Wallis tests (see Table 12) 
that these two categories have statistically significant different distributions from the other 
categories in amongst the three groups.  The researchers are unable to say for certain why 
these categories do not have distributions similar at least one of the other category 
groupings, but one possible explanation is that contractors view these as operational costs 
(not purely corporate overhead).  The potentially varying perceptions of what type of costs 
these categories are (direct or indirect) may explain why there is a relatively high level of 
variability in reduction level responses for these areas. 
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Table 18 
Spearman Correlations Between Corporate Overhead Categories 
Descriptive Statistics Completely Flexible Potential Flexible Inflexible 
 
Bonuses Charitable or holiday gifts Home office: 
benefits paid 
Company functions 
(parties, etc.) 
Training or education Home office: staff 
salary 
Charitable or holiday 
gifts 
Contributions to 
retirement plans, etc. 
Home office: 
insurance costs 
 Corporate officer’s salary Home office: 
space (i.e., rent) 
 Business development or 
accounting staff 
 
Overhead Reduction: Mean 2.152 1.073 0.497 
Overhead Reduction: Median 2 0 0 
Overhead Reduction: Mode 0 0 0 
Overhead Reduction: StdDev 1.830 1.498 1.032 
 
Study Limitations 
The researcher acknowledges two primary limitations of this research.  First, 
respondents were asked to identify overhead reductions based on a series of ranges (rather 
than the specific overhead reduction).  The survey instrument was intentionally designed 
this way to encourage a higher response rate, but it came at a cost of data precision.  
Furthermore, the overhead reductions do not express the magnitude of said reduction with 
respect to the respondent company’s overall financial position.  Reductions in certain 
categories (especially those in the Completely Flexible group) might be easy to reduce, but 
may only have a negligible impact on their bottom line corporate overhead cost.  This area 
needs further research and study. 
A second limitation is that the researchers cannot guarantee that all respondents 
included in this study are actually contractors.  The researchers removed those respondents 
whose companies were known to be non-contractors (i.e., an architect), but there was no 
way to identify the companies of respondents that did not provide this identifying 
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information in their response.  The survey itself was intentionally distributed to just 
contractors, but very likely the survey website link was forwarded on to others and diluted 
the pool of respondents.  However, we expect that the number of non-contractor responses 
is low, given the relative frequency of known contractors in the pool of all respondents. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGILITY STUDY 
Review of the literature identified four general concepts related to organizational 
agility (OA): leverage core competencies, seek new opportunities, implement performance 
metrics, and strategically pre-plan efforts or projects.  Though the ideas were seeded in the 
manufacturing industry, they have applicability in the public sector accountability 
frameworks.  Agile organizations are responsive to their constituents, use their funds 
efficiently, are able to quantify their value and performance, and are successful regardless 
of the economic conditions.  These are all the tenets of highly accountable, highly 
transparent organizations. 
The researcher studied the applicability of a Value-Based Model in helping public 
entities become more agile in their provision of governmental services.  The Model assists 
organizations by providing a structured approach to increasing their organizational agility.  
The various agile concepts are used through the three-phased approach of the VBM.  The 
first phase (Selection) focuses primarily on the private industry’s ability to help strengthen 
the public entity’s core competencies through the identification of contractor expertise.  
During the second phase (Pre-planning), the contractor and public owner strategically plan 
out the project, focusing on project risk and clarifying the key project outcomes.  In the 
final phase (Project Execution), the contractor is required to document project cost and 
schedule performance.  The agency then utilizes the performance results to understand the 
overall status of projects, identify opportunities for improvement, and communicate to the 
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public how funding is being used.  Therefore, diligent implementation of the VBM (and 
each of its three phases) results in increased public accountability. 
The paper concludes with a case study of 415 public works projects across eight 
public agencies delivered with the Value-Based Model.  The agencies implemented 
performance metrics that identify the sources of any project cost or schedule deviations, 
and saved approximately 57 percent compared to the traditional low-accountability 
method, an average of $1.4M and 163 calendar days per project.  Furthermore, the 
researcher found that proposers were still cost competitive, as the awarded contractors were 
the lowest bidder 53 percent of the time, and an average of 2.6 percent below the stated 
budgets in the RFP. 
 
AGILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATE OVERHEAD STUDY 
Nearly every firm surveyed for this study reported that they cut overhead as a result 
of the Great Recession.  It is likely that many of these firm’s overhead expenses were seen 
as a permanent part of their corporate financial structure (Schleifer et al., 2014; Snodgrass, 
1991).  That fact that the large majority of firms reported cutting some level of overhead 
indicates that much of this cost may have actually been excess in the first place, much as 
the literature suggests. 
While the recession had a negative impact on many people, and especially those in 
construction, the researcher proposes that it also presents a fresh opportunity for 
organizations to reconsider how they manage their overhead expenses.  As the market 
continues to improve, companies will need to begin bringing back these overhead costs 
(people, assets, and so on).  The major results of the paper were: 
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1. Nearly every firm surveyed cut at least some overhead.  92 percent of all 
respondents reduced overhead in about five different areas.  The average overhead 
reduction was between 1% and 10%.  Bonuses, Company Functions, and Charitable 
/ Holiday Gifts had the highest levels of reductions, while Home Office Staff Salary 
and Home Office Insurance Costs had almost no decreases. 
2. Larger companies reduce less overhead as a percentage of their total.  This may 
indicate that smaller companies have more flexibility in their overhead expenses or 
were less able to maintain normal operations during the recession. 
3. Roofing did not make many any statistically significant changes to their overhead 
levels.  One explanation is that perhaps the rain still came down and the flood still 
occurred regardless of what the economy was doing – that is, construction buyers 
always have a need for roofing work.  Another potential explanation is that a large 
percentage of the roofing industry is replacement, repair, and maintenance 
compared to other trades, and thus they were not as impacted by the recession. 
4. There were higher levels of overhead reduction for $100.1M - $500M contractors, 
who primarily perform Manufacturing work. One explanation is that this sector was 
one of the hardest hit in the economy and thus the construction contractors for these 
sectors also got hit the hardest. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Further analysis could also examine the relationship between different types of 
companies, market sectors, and overhead changes.  Additional research is also 
recommended on the potential organizational culture aspects of the construction industry 
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as they relate to creating flexible organizations.  This research may provide a deeper 
understanding of the cultural norms that lead to the creation of “permanent” overhead 
expenses within the construction industry. 
 
OVERHEAD FLEXIBILITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STUDY 
The Great Recession of 2008 – 2013 forced many companies, especially those in 
the built environment, to reconsider their core competencies in an effort to just simply stay 
in business – let alone improve their bottom line financial position.  There has been a 
massive outflow of the construction industry work force and there are no doubt concerns 
for the long term status of the industry (Elsby et al., 2010).  Many companies reduced 
corporate overhead to cut their losses, but many of them likely made the cuts too late 
(Schleifer, 2015). 
The researchers conducted a survey of more than 400 contractors and asked them 
to identify how much they reduced certain categories of corporate overhead as a result of 
the recession.  The results revealed weak negative, but statistically significant, relationships 
between company size (annual revenue and number of employees), and “Corporate 
officer’s salary”, “Travel or company vehicles”, “Charitable or holiday gifts”, and 
“Company functions (parties, etc.)”, while company size had almost no impact on 
reductions to “Training or education”, “Business development or accounting staff”, “Home 
office: space”, and “Home office: staff salary”. 
Additional analysis suggests that there are distinct categories of overhead 
flexibility: Completely Flexible, Potentially Flexible, and Inflexible.  During times of 
financial crisis, all categories of overhead should be evaluated, but the proposed overhead 
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flexibility classification system may provide contractors with added precision as they 
analyze their finances. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The proposed overhead flexibility categories are based on the changes contractors 
make in response to a severe financial crisis.  Additional research should be conducted to 
study how highly successful contractors fared during the recession with respect to the 
proposed classification system. 
 
70 
REFERENCES 
10S-90: Cost Engineering Terminology. (2012, May). Retrieved June 7, 2016, from 
http://www.aacei.org/resources/terminology/ 
Ahmad, I., & Minkarah, I. (1988). Questionnaire Survey on Bidding in Construction. 
Journal of Management in Engineering, 4(3), 229–243. 
http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)9742-597X(1988)4:3(229) 
Ahuja, H. N., & Campbell, W. J. (1988). Estimating: from concept to completion. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Ankrah, N. A., & Langford, D. A. (2005). Architects and contractors: a comparative 
study of organizational cultures. Construction Management and Economics, 
23(6), 595–607. 
Arteta, B. M., & Giachetti, R. E. (2004). A measure of agility as the complexity of the 
enterprise system. Robotics and Computer-Integrated Manufacturing, 20(6), 495–
503. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcim.2004.05.008 
Assaf, S. A., Bubshait, A. A., Atiyah, S., & Al-Shahri, M. (2001). The management of 
construction company overhead costs. International Journal of Project 
Management, 19(5), 295–303. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00011-9 
Becker, T. C., Jaselskis, E. J., & El-Gafy, M. (2014). Improving Predictability of 
Construction Project Outcomes through Intentional Management of Indirect 
Construction Costs. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
140(6), 4014014. http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000845 
Blaxill, M., & Hout, T. (1991, July). The fallacy of the overhead quick fix. Harvard 
Business Review, 69(4), 93–101. 
Camp, R. C. (1989). Benchmarking: the search for industry best practices that lead to 
superior performance. Milwaukee, Wis. : White Plains, N.Y: Quality Press ; 
Quality Resources. 
Cilensek, R. (1991). Understanding Contractor Overhead. Cost Engineering, 33(12), 21. 
Condon, E., & Hartman, F. (2004). Playing Games. AACE International Transactions, 
PM141-PM146. 
Cotts, D. (2003). Innovative contracting. Facilities Design & Management, 22(1), 28–29. 
71 
Dale, D. (1989). Controlling Overheads Without Killing The Business. Australian 
Accountant, 59(1), 74. 
Dale, D., & Bevington, T. (1989). Effective Resource Management: Achieving Overhead 
Control. Australian Accountant, 59(2), 27. 
D’Aveni, R. A., & Gunther, R. E. (1994). Hypercompetition: managing the dynamics of 
strategic maneuvering. New York; Toronto: The Free Press. 
Day, P., & Klein, R. (1987). Accountabilities: five public services. London: Tavistock. 
DeVellis, R. F. (2011). Scale Development: Theory and Applications (3rd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Dicke, L. A., & Ott, J. S. (1999). Public Agency Accountability in Human Services 
Contracting. Public Productivity & Management Review, 22(4), 502–516. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/3380933 
Dorée, A. G. (2004). Collusion in the Dutch construction industry: An industrial 
organization perspective. Building Research & Information, 32(2), 146–156. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/0961321032000172382 
Dunn, O. J. (1964). Multiple Comparisons Using Rank Sums. Technometrics, 6(3), 241–
252. http://doi.org/10.2307/1266041 
Dyer, L., & Shafer, R. (1998). From Human Resource Strategy to Organizational 
Effectiveness: Lessons from Research on Organizational Agility. CAHRS 
Working Paper Series. Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/125 
Elsby, M. W., Hobijn, B., & Sahin, A. (2010). The Labor Market in the Great Recession 
(Working Paper No. 15979). National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved 
from http://www.nber.org/papers/w15979 
Ernstrom, J. W., & Essler, K. S. (1982). Beyond the Eichleay Formula: Resurrecting 
Home Office Overhead Claims. Construction Lawyer, 3, 1. 
Evan, W. M. (1963). Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study: 
Comment. American Sociological Review, 28(1), 67–69. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2090459 
72 
Fibuch, E., & Van Way, C. W. (2013). Benchmarking’s Role in Driving Performance. 
Physician Executive, 39(1), 28–32. 
Finer, H. (1941). Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government. Public 
Administration Review, 1(4), 335–350. http://doi.org/10.2307/972907 
Fisher, R. A. (1915). Frequency Distribution of the Values of the Correlation Coefficient 
in Samples from an Indefinitely Large Population. Biometrika, 10(4), 507–521. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2331838 
Fultz, J. F. (1980). Overhead, what it is and how it works. Cambridge, Mass: Abt Books. 
Georgy, M. E., Chang, L.-M., & Zhang, L. (2005). Engineering Performance in the US 
Industrial Construction Sector. Cost Engineering, 47(1), 27–36. 
Gerwin, D. (2005). An agenda for research on the flexibility of manufacturing processes. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 25(12), 1171–
1182. 
Gibson Jr., G., Kaczmarowski, J., & Lore Jr., H. (1995). Preproject-Planning Process for 
Capital Facilities. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 121(3), 
312–318. http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(1995)121:3(312) 
Goldman, S. L., Nagel, R. N., & Preiss, K. (1995). Agile Competitors and Virtual 
Organizations: Strategies for. Journal of Systems Management, 46(4), 31. 
Gong, Y., & Janssen, M. (2012). From policy implementation to business process 
management: Principles for creating flexibility and agility. Government 
Information Quarterly, 29, Supplement 1, S61–S71. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2011.08.004 
Gore, A. (1993). NPR 93-a Report of the National Performance Review. Washington, 
D.C. Retrieved from http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/npr93a/npr93a.txt 
Greene, J. D. (2005). Public administration in the new century: a concise introduction. 
Australia ; Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. 
Gruber, A. (2005, February 7). Program assessments factor into Bush plan to trim deficit. 
Retrieved June 3, 2011, from 
http://www.govexec.com/management/2005/02/program-assessments-factor-into-
bush-plan-to-trim-deficit/18539/ 
73 
Gunasekaran, A. (1999). Agile manufacturing: A framework for research and 
development. International Journal of Production Economics, 62(1–2), 87–105. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-5273(98)00222-9 
Hegazy, T., & Moselhi, O. (1995). Elements of cost estimation: A survey in Canada and 
the United States. Cost Engineering, 37(5), 27. 
Herbt M. Baruch Corporation v United States (United States Court of Claims March 3, 
1941). 
Holland, N. L., & Hobson, D. (1999). Indirect Cost Categorization and Allocation by 
Construction Contractors. Journal of Architectural Engineering, 5(2), 49–56. 
http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)1076-0431(1999)5:2(49) 
Holzer, M., & Schwester, R. W. (2011). Public Administration: An Introduction. 
Armonk, N.Y: Routledge. 
Ibbs, W., Baker, B., & Burckhardt, F. (2015). Process Model for Identifying and 
Computing Allowable Home Office Overhead Cost Claims. Journal of Legal 
Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction, 7(3), 4514007. 
http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)LA.1943-4170.0000164 
Jaselskis, E., Kurtenbach, J., & Forrest, J. (2002). Enhancing Financial Success Among 
Electrical Contractors. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
128(1), 65–75. http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2002)128:1(65) 
Justice, J. B., & Miller, G. J. (2011). Accountability and Debt Management: The Case of 
New York’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The American Review of 
Public Administration, 41(3), 313–328. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010377110 
Kamensky, J. (2001, January 12). A Brief History of Vice President Al Gore’s National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government During the Administration of President 
Bill Clinton 1993-2001. Retrieved July 24, 2015, from 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/historyofnpr.html 
Kashiwagi, D. (2012). Best Value Approach. Mesa, Arizona: KSM, Inc. 
Kessler, J. B., & Leider, S. (2011). Norms and Contracting. Management Science, 58(1), 
62–77. http://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1341 
74 
Kline, R. B. (2004). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, Second 
Edition (2nd ed.). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Knutsson, H., Ramberg, U., & Tagesson, T. (2012). Benchmarking Impact through 
Municipal Benchmarking Networks: Improvement or Leveling of Performance? 
Public Performance & Management Review, 36(1), 102–123. 
http://doi.org/10.2753/PMR1530-9576360105 
Levene, H. (1960). Robust tests for equality of variances. In I. Olkin (Ed.), Contributions 
to probability and statistics; essays in honor of Harold Hotelling (pp. 278–292). 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Li, L., & Zhao, X. (2006). Enhancing competitive edge through knowledge management 
in implementing ERP systems. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 23(2), 
129–140. http://doi.org/10.1002/sres.758 
Lines, B. C., Sullivan, K. T., Hurtado, K. C., & Savicky, J. (2014). Planning in 
Construction: Longitudinal Study of Pre-Contract Planning Model Demonstrates 
Reduction in Project Cost and Schedule Growth. International Journal of 
Construction Education and Research. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/15578771.2013.872733 
Lines, B. C., Sullivan, K. T., Smithwick, J. B., & Mischung, J. (2015). Overcoming 
resistance to change in engineering and construction: Change management factors 
for owner organizations. International Journal of Project Management, 33(5), 
1170–1179. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2015.01.008 
Macias-Lizaso, G., & Thiel, K. (2006). Building a nimble organization: A McKinsey 
Global Survey. McKinsey & Company. 
Marquardt, J. (2001, November 15). Delivering the goods in a tight economy. Daily 
Journal of Commerce. Seattle, WA. Retrieved from 
http://www.djc.com/news/ae/11127670.html 
McGaughey, R. E. (1999). Internet technology: contributing to agility in the twenty-first 
century. International Journal of Agile Management Systems, 1(1), 7–13. 
Myers, L., & Sirois, M. J. (2004). Spearman Correlation Coefficients, Differences 
between. In Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Retrieved from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0471667196.ess5050.pub2/abstract 
75 
Nagel, R. N., & Dove, R. (1991). 21st Century Manufacturing Enterprise Strategy: An 
Industry-Led View. DIANE Publishing. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. (2010). Business Cycle Dating Committee. 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html 
Nohria, N., Joyce, W., & Roberson, B. (2003, July). What Really Works. Harvard 
Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2003/07/what-really-works 
Norfleet, D. A. (2007). The Theory of Indirect Costs. AACE International Transactions, 
ES121-ES126. 
Oviedo-Haito, R. J., Jiménez, J., Cardoso, F. F., & Pellicer, E. (2014). Survival Factors 
for Subcontractors in Economic Downturns. Journal of Construction Engineering 
and Management, 140(3), 4013056. http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-
7862.0000811 
Palmer, W. J., Coombs, W. E., & Smith, M. A. (1995). Construction accounting and 
financial management (5th ed). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Pernici, B., & Weske, M. (2006). Business process management. Data & Knowledge 
Engineering, 56(1), 1–3. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.datak.2005.02.003 
Plebankiewicz, E., & Leśniak, A. (2013). Overhead costs and profit calculation by Polish 
contractors. Technological and Economic Development of Economy, 19(1), 141–
161. http://doi.org/10.3846/20294913.2012.763008 
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior 
performance. New York: Free Press. 
Post, N. (1998, May 11). Building teams get high marks. Engineering News Record, 
240(19), 32–39. 
Powell Jr, W. R. (2002). Organizational change models. Futurics, 26(3/4), 20. 
Prahalad, C., & Hamel, G. (1990, May). The Core Competence of the Corporation. 
Harvard Business Review, 68(3), 79–91. 
Pratt, D. (2010). Fundamentals of Construction Estimating (3 edition). Australia ; 
Boston, MA: Delmar Cengage Learning. 
76 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC). (2009). Need to know: Delivering capital project value 
in the downturn. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/co/es/energia-mineria-y-
servicios-publicos/assets/need-to-know-eum-capital-projects.pdf 
Quinn, J. B., & Hillmer, F. G. (1995, January). Strategic outsourcing. The McKinsey 
Quarterly, (1), 48–70. 
Rist, R. C. (1989). Management Accountability: The Signals Sent by Auditing and 
Evaluation. Journal of Public Policy, 9(3), 355–369. 
Rivlin, A. M. (1971). Systematic thinking for social action. Washington: Brookings 
Institution. 
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1987). Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Challenger Tragedy. Public Administration Review, 47(3), 227–238. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/975901 
Şahin, A., Song, J., & Hobijn, B. (2010). The Unemployment Gender Gap during the 
2007 Recession. Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 16(2), 1–7. 
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership (Vol. 2). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Schleifer, T. C. (1981). Construction troubleshooters can save development costs: 
workout group monitoring of project sites often reveals overruns, cheating. The 
American Banker, 146(Journal Article), 19. 
Schleifer, T. C. (2009, March 11). Prospering in Cyclical Markets. Engineering News-
Record. Retrieved from 
http://enr.construction.com/opinions/viewPoint/2009/0311-InCyclicalMarket.asp 
Schleifer, T. C. (2014a, June 4). A Success Formula for Contractors for Good Times and 
Bad. Engineering News-Record. Retrieved from 
http://enr.construction.com/opinions/viewpoint/2014/0602asuccessformulaforcont
ractorsforgoodtimesandbod.asp 
Schleifer, T. C. (2014b, October 27). Contractors, Let Go of Unneeded Overhead. 
Engineering News-Record. Retrieved from 
http://enr.construction.com/opinions/viewpoint/2014/1027-don8217t-hang-on-to-
unneeded-overhead.asp 
77 
Schleifer, T. C. (2015, September 16). Overhead: A Silent Killer. Engineering News-
Record. Retrieved from http://www.enr.com/articles/17186-overhead-a-silent-
killer 
Schleifer, T. C., Sullivan, K. T., & Murdough, J. M. (2014). Managing the Profitable 
Construction Business: The Contractor’s Guide to Success and Survival 
Strategies (2 edition). Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. 
Schoen, M. S. (2007). Good Enough for Government Work: The Government 
Performance Results Act of 1993 and Its Impact on Federal Agencies. Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal, 32, 455. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1943). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Routledge. 
Singh, D., & Tiong, R. L. K. (2005). A Fuzzy Decision Framework for Contractor 
Selection. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 131(1), 62–70. 
http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2005)131:1(62) 
Siverbo, S., & Johansson, T. (2006). Relative Performance Evaluation in Swedish Local 
Government. Financial Accountability & Management, 22(3), 271–290. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0267-4424.2006.00403.x 
Smithwick, J., Schultz, T., Sullivan, K., & Kashiwagi, D. (2013). A model for the 
Creation of Shared Assumptions and Effective Preplanning. International Journal 
of Facility Management, 4(3). Retrieved from 
http://ijfm.net/index.php/ijfm/article/view/90/87 
Snodgrass, T. (1991). Ideal Overhead: Lean and Mean. Credit Union Management, 14(4), 
44. 
Sturts, C., & Griffis, B. (2005). Addressing Pricing: Value Bidding for Engineers and 
Consultants. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 131(6), 621–
630. http://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9364(2005)131:6(621) 
Sull, D. (2009, December). Competing through organizational agility. McKinsey 
Quarterly. Retrieved from 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/managing_in_uncertainty/competing_through
_organizational_agility 
Sullivan, K., Kashiwagi, D., & Chong, N. (2009). The Influence of an Information 
Environment on Construction Organization’s Culture: A Case Study. Advances in 
Civil Engineering, 2009, e387608. http://doi.org/10.1155/2009/387608 
78 
Sullivan, K. T. (2011). Quality Management Programs in the Construction Industry: Best 
Value Compared with Other Methodologies. Journal of Management in 
Engineering, 27(4), 210–219. 
The Associated General Contractors of America. (2014). 2014 Workforce Survey Results. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.agc.org/sites/default/files/Files/Communications/2014_Workforce_N
ational_0.pdf 
Thomson, D. B., Becker, M., & Wieland, J. (2007). A Critique of Best Value Contracting 
in Minnesota. William Mitchell Law Review, 34, 25. 
Vargha, A., & Delaney, H. D. (1998). The Kruskal-Wallis Test and Stochastic 
Homogeneity. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 23(2), 170–192. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/1165320 
Walsh, P., Bryson, J., & Lonti, Z. (2002). `Jack be Nimble, Jill be Quick’: HR Capability 
and Organizational Agility in the New Zealand Public and Private Sectors. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 40(2), 177–192. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/1038411102040002337 
Welch, B. L. (1947). The Generalization of `Student’s’ Problem when Several Different 
Population Variances are Involved. Biometrika, 34(1/2), 28–35. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2332510 
Westney Consulting Group. (2014). Approximating the Disproportionate Growth in the 
Cost of Capital Projects. Retrieved from http://www.westney.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Approximating-the-Disproportionate-Growth-in-the-
Cost-of-Capital-Projects.pdf 
Wiggins, R. R., & Ruefli, T. W. (2005). Schumpeter’s ghost: Is hypercompetition making 
the best of times shorter? Strategic Management Journal, 26(10), 887–911. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/smj.492 
Worley, C. G., Williams, T., & Lawler III, E. E. (2014). The Agility Factor: Building 
Adaptable Organizations for Superior Performance (1 edition). San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Yusuf, Y. Y., Sarhadi, M., & Gunasekaran, A. (1999). Agile manufacturing:: The drivers, 
concepts and attributes. International Journal of Production Economics, 62(1–2), 
33–43. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-5273(98)00219-9 
79 
APPENDIX A  
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY OVERHEAD REDUCTION SURVEY 
  
80 
Part One 
 
Part Two 
 
